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I. INTRODUCTION
Some speech risks inciting or aiding serious crimes.  Other speech risks causing 
only minor crimes.  Some searches and seizures are aimed at catching kidnappers, 
others at catching bookies.  
Should constitutional doctrine draw lines that turn on crime severity?  And if it 
should, how should these lines be drawn?  Commentators and judges have often 
urged that the first question be answered “yes.”1  After all, if courts are to balance 
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1 See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 365 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (as
to warrantless arrests); United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 n.1 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (as to Terry v. Ohio stops); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 379-81 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (as to searches of public school students); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 
266-67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (as to warrantless arrests); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 
494, 510 (1951) (plurality) (as to speech aimed at producing criminal conduct); Brinegar v. United 
States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (as to the Fourth Amendment generally); 
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (as to the Fourth 
Amendment generally); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring in 
the judgment) (as to speech aimed at producing criminal conduct); Llaguno v. Mingey, 763 F.2d 
1560, 1566-67 (7th Cir. 1985) (as to probable cause needed to search); United States v. Soyka, 394 
F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (as to exclusionary rule); United States v. 
Queen, 26 M.J. 136, 140 & n.1 (Ct. Mil. App. 1988) (as to probable cause needed for a search 
authorization); Park v. Forest Service, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1175-76 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (as to propriety 
of police checkpoint); State v. Bolt, 689 P.2d 519, 530 (Ariz. 1984) (Cameron, J., specially 
concurring) (as to exclusionary rule); People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1972) (as to exigent 
circumstances and probable cause); People v. Schader, 401 P.2d 665, 669 (Cal. 1965) (as to probable 
cause), overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill, 853 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1993); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 801-02 (1994) (as to Fourth 
Amendment generally); Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468, 1491, 1500 (1985); James Duke Cameron & Richard Lustiger, The Exclusionary Rule: A Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 101 F.R.D. 109, 145 (1984) (as to exclusionary rule); Sherry F. Colb, The 
Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1645 
(1998) (as to searches generally); M.K.B. Darmer, Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in 
an Age of Terrorism, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 368-69 (2003) (as to “shock the 
conscience” test under the Due Process Clause); Interview with Alan M. Dershowitz, 60 Minutes, 
CBS NEWS, Jan. 20, 2002 (as to prohibition of torture); John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary 
Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1046-47 (1974) (as to exclusionary rule); Wayne R. LaFave, “Street 
Encounters” and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 57 (1968-
69) (as to Terry v. Ohio stops); Craig S. Lerner, The Reasonableness of Probable Cause, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 951, 970-71, 1016-17 (2003) (as to probable cause); Wayne A. Logan, Street Legal: The Court 
Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 458 (2002) (as to warrantless arrests); 
Erik Luna, Drug Exceptionalism, 47 VILL. L. REV. 753, 781-87 (2002) (summarizing but criticizing 
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constitutional rights against government interests, and the government interest is in 
preventing crime, the weight of the government interest must turn on the seriousness 
of the crime the government is trying to avert.2 Constitutional law shouldn’t be
forced into unitary rules that underprotect rights when the government interest in 
preventing a crime is minor, or underprotect government power when the 
government interest is great.
And yet the trouble with a “yes” answer is that it requires courts to answer the 
second question—a question that is thorny indeed.  People often bitterly disagree 
about how severe various crimes are.  To some, many drug crimes are comparatively 
minor,3 or shouldn’t be crimes at all.  To others, they are next to murder.  To some, 
white-collar crimes, as nonviolent offenses, are relatively minor.  To others, they are 
the moral equivalent of armed robbery, different chiefly in the wealth and social 
standing of the criminals.4  Likewise, there are disagreements about the seriousness 
of copyright infringement, burglary,5 and other offenses.
Even the classic and oft-praised6 opinion that urges courts to draw severity 
distinctions, Justice Jackson’s 1949 dissent in Brinegar v. United States, illustrates 
some such arguments made as to searches); Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 
1981 SUP. CT. REV. 49, 74-75 (as to searches generally); Martin Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful 
Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159, 
1179-80 (1982) (as to speech aimed at producing criminal conduct); William J. Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, 
Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 852 (2001) (as to 
Fourth Amendment generally); Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech (circulated for 
publication) (as to speech communicating information that may help some recipients commit crimes).
2
 I say “avert” rather than “punish,” but the two go hand in hand:  Punishing past murders, for 
instance, is seen as particularly likely to avert future murders, or at least future serious violent crimes, 
because murderers tend to be more likely to commit other violent crimes (though of course that need 
not be so as to each individual murderer).  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1998, at 10-11 (reporting that 81% of 
felony murder defendants in the nation’s 75 largest urban counties had an arrest record, and 67% had 
a felony arrest record).
3 Cf., e.g., Stuntz, supra note 1, at 852 (suggesting that under the Fourth Amendment probable 
cause and a warrant shouldn’t be enough to justify searches of homes in cases of “less-than-serious 
drug cases—anything associated with marijuana would be a good example,” though it should be 
enough to justify such searches where serious crimes, such as murder, are involved); cases cited infra
note 39.
4
 “Some will rob you with a six-gun, and some with a fountain pen.”  Woody Guthrie, Pretty Boy 
Floyd, on Folkways, the Original Vision (Smithsonian Folkways 1989, 1940); THE WOODY GUTHRIE 
SONGBOOK 187 (Harold Leventhal & Marjorie Guthrie eds. 1976).  The line may have referred to 
noncriminal use of fountain pens (for instance, in foreclosure and the like), but presumably it would a 
fortiori apply to white-collar crime.
5 Compare, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (reasoning that burglary isn’t a 
serious enough crime to justify use of deadly force to stop a fleeing burglary suspect) with id. at 23 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for “disregarding the serious and dangerous nature 
of residential burglaries”); infra note 40.
6 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 801-02; William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 
YALE L.J. 2137, 2140 n.8 (2002); Darmer, supra note 1, at 368-69.
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this difficulty.  Justice Jackson eloquently argued that the government should have 
less power to engage in searches and seizures when it’s pursuing petty criminals, 
such as alcohol smugglers,7 than when it’s pursuing serious criminals, such as 
kidnappers. But alcohol causes many deaths, many crimes, and much other harm.  
Today, for instance, alcohol use is implicated in 100,000 deaths each year, including 
likely about 10,000 deaths of innocent bystanders.8  Oklahoma—the state into which 
Brinegar was trying to smuggle alcohol—was a dry state from its admission into the 
union until 1959, and it never ratified the Twenty-First Amendment.9 The Oklahoma 
legislature may have viewed alcohol smuggling as far from a petty offense;10 and it’s 
7
 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting):
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment [because of the special 
nature of cars], it seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.  
If we assume, for example, that a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock about 
the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, . . . I should candidly strive hard to sustain 
such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable to subject 
travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious 
crime.  But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal search to salvage a 
few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.
See also McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 459 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring) (taking the 
same view with regard to a search, supposedly supported by exigent circumstances, aimed at finding 
evidence of running a numbers game).
8 See J. McGinnis & W. Foege, Actual Causes of Death in the United States, 270 JAMA 2208, 
Nov. 10, 1993 (reporting the 100,000 deaths figure).  I calculate the innocent bystanders estimate 
(which of course is just a rough estimate) by adding the deaths from intentional homicides where the 
killer had been drinking (about 4,000 to 5,000) and drunk driving deaths of people other than the 
drunk driver (about 5,000); I couldn’t find good statistics on other causes of death, such as non-auto 
accidents caused by drinking.  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, ALCOHOL 
AND CRIME 29 (1998) (reporting that in about 25% of murders and manslaughters, the killer “was 
drinking at the time of the violent offense”); Centers for Disease Control, WISQARS Injury Mortality 
Reports, 1999-2001, http://webapp.cdc.gov/sasweb/ncipc/mortrate10_fy.html (reporting that in 1999-
2001, there were about 16,000-20,000 intentional homicides in the U.S. per year); NATIONAL SAFETY 
COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 94 (2003) (reporting that in 2001, about 15,000 people were killed in car 
crashes where someone was drunk, and 33% of them were passengers or nonintoxicated drivers).
9
 Oklahoma law barred the manufacturing, sale, or importation of virtually all beverages with 
more than 4% alcohol.  See OKLA. STAT. tit. 37, § 1 (1941) (barring manufacturing or sale of 
beverages with more than 3.2% alcohol); id. § 32 (prohibiting possession of more than one gallon of 
spirits or wine, or one cask of malt liquor); id. at 41 (prohibiting importation of beverages with more 
than 4% alcohol).  See also Okla. Sess. Laws 1959, at 141; OKLA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (1907)
(prohibiting distribution of alcohol in the former Indian Territory, a huge part of Oklahoma), repealed 
by OKLA. CONST. art. XXVII (1959); JIMMIE L. FRANKLIN, BORN SOBER, PROHIBITION IN OKLAHOMA 
1907-1959 (1971) (discussing prohibition throughout Oklahoma).
10
 The prohibition was naturally not enforced with great sternness.  Selling or manufacturing 
stronger drinks was punished only as a misdemeanor for the first offense, with a maximum sentence 
of 6 months in jail, and possession of small amounts of alcohol at home wasn’t criminalized, though 
importation was punished by up to five years in prison.  OKLA. STATS. tit. 37, §§ 1, 12 (1951).  But I 
suspect that this just reflected the difficulties of practically enforcing alcohol prohibition, given the 
magnitude of noncompliance by otherwise law-abiding people.  A reasonable legislature may well 
have concluded both that alcohol was extremely dangerous, and that imprisoning moonshiners and 
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not clear what principled way there was for the Court to reject that judgment.11
This Essay can’t fully answer the two questions I asked at the outset.  The 
answers should probably differ for different constitutional provisions, and should be 
deduced with an eye towards the attributes of the particular right that’s involved.
But it does aim to lay out four categories of possible answers, and to briefly outline 
some of the pluses and minuses of each.  (Surprisingly, few works have so far 
discussed this matter broadly and systematically.12)  I hope this will be helpful to 
others who come across this recurring problem.  And I hope it will at least suggest 
that two simple answers—that such severity distinctions are always improper, and 
that they are unproblematic—are mistaken.
II. OPTION 1:  REJECTING SEVERITY DISTINCTIONS
To begin with, judges could refuse to incorporate crime severity judgments into 
constitutional rules, precisely because it’s so hard to make these determinations in a 
principled way.13 At times, the Court has seemingly asserted this as a constitutional 
mandate.  In Mincey v. Arizona, for instance, the Court declined to create a “murder 
scene” exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, reasoning that 
courts had no manageable standards for drawing a line between murders and other 
crimes:
[T]he public interest in the investigation of other serious crimes is comparable.  If the 
warrantless search of a homicide scene is reasonable, why not the warrantless search of 
the scene of a rape, a robbery, or a burglary?  “No consideration relevant to the Fourth 
illegal vendors for many years would be impractical.  Cf. William A. Schroeder, Factoring the 
Seriousness of the Offense into the Fourth Amendment Equations—Warrantless Entries into 
Premises: The Legacy of Welsh v. Wisconsin, 38 KAN. L. REV. 439, 516 (1990) (concluding that 
relatively lenient treatment for a crime “may not always reflect a cavalier attitude toward the offense,” 
but rather “a feeling that penal sanctions are not always the best solution to a social problem,” or “a 
desire to ‘increase the ease of conviction and the overall deterrent effect of the enforcement effort,’” 
quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 763 (1989) (White, J., dissenting)).
11 There is, of course, little problem with legislatures making such judgments, because 
legislatures are expected to simply apply their moral and pragmatic judgments, even if this means 
drawing seemingly arbitrary lines.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 2516(1), (2) (amended in part by the USA 
Patriot Act, 107th Cong., 1st Sess., P.L. 107-56, sec. 201 (2001)) (defining crimes that prosecutors 
may generally use wiretaps to investigate); 18 PA. CONSOL. STAT. §§ 5708(1), (2) (likewise).
12
 A quick WESTLAW search, for instance, finds few articles that even cite both Branzburg v. 
Hayes and Mincey v. Arizona—the two leading Supreme Court cases that reject severity distinctions 
in First Amendment and Fourth Amendment cases—and none of them discusses those two cases 
together.  For excellent treatments focused on the Fourth Amendment, see Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill 
Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, supra note 1; Luna, supra note 1, at 778-87; 
Schroeder, supra note 10.
13 Cf. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 352 (2000) (“It is of course easier to devise a 
minor-offense limitation by statute than to derive one through the Constitution, simply because the 
statute can let the arrest power turn on any sort of political consideration without having to subsume it 
under a broader principle.”).
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Amendment suggests any point of rational limitation” of such a doctrine.14
Likewise, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court allowed searches of public school 
students based merely on reasonable suspicion, and refused to limit this doctrine to 
searches for evidence of serious offenses:
We are unwilling to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent 
upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules. . . .  The 
promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a judgment on 
the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper 
educational environment. Absent any suggestion that the rule violates some substantive 
constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer to that judgment 
and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to the 
preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.15
And in Branzburg v. Hayes, the Court declined to create a First Amendment 
journalists’ privilege that was sensitive to the severity of the crime being 
investigated:
[B]y considering whether enforcement of a particular law served a “compelling” 
governmental interest, the courts would be inextricably involved in distinguishing 
between the value of enforcing different criminal laws.  By requiring testimony from a 
reporter in investigations involving some crimes but not in others, they would be making 
a value judgment that a legislature had declined to make, since in each case the criminal 
law involved would represent a considered legislative judgment, not constitutionally 
suspect, of what conduct is liable to criminal prosecution.  The task of judges, like other 
officials outside the legislative branch, is not to make the law but to uphold it in 
accordance with their oaths.16
If this is right, then it seems that constitutional rules may never require courts to 
evaluate the severity of crimes.  Any such evaluation requires judges to 
“distinguish[] between the value of enforcing different criminal laws,” to “mak[e] a 
value judgment that a legislature had declined to make,” and to draw distinctions 
analogous to those between murder and rape, robbery, and burglary.
14
 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).  See also Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (refusing to 
create a special rule based on anonymous tips that someone has a weapon, partly because “one [could 
not] securely confine such an exception to allegations involving firearms,” though noting that there 
might be a special exemption where “the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to 
justify a search even without a showing of reliability,” for instance when there is “a report of a person 
carrying a bomb”); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1997) (refusing to categorically 
exclude drug crimes from the requirement that police knock and announce themselves when 
performing a search, unless exigent circumstances are present, because “the reasons for creating an 
exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others”; “[i]f a per se exception were 
allowed for each category of criminal investigation that included a considerable—albeit 
hypothetical—risk of danger to officers or destruction of evidence, the knock-and-announce element 
of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningless”); Chimel v. 
California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (insisting that decisions about the permissible scope of searches 
incident to arrest be based on “reasoned distinctions,” rather than arbitrary line-drawing based on the 
size of the area to be searched).
15 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985).
16
 408 U.S. 665, 705 (1972).
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Refusing to consider crime severity would avoid such hard-to-defend judgments 
about how important various laws are, and would also yield rules that are easier to 
apply.  The Court can, for instance, announce that there may be no warrantless 
searches of people’s homes (subject to a few exceptions, such as exigent 
circumstances), with no need for often controversial and unpredictable case-by-case 
decisions about which crimes are serious enough to justify a “crime scene 
exception.”
Many constitutional doctrines are indeed not relaxed, at least officially, when the 
crime is especially severe.  The case against relaxing the constitutional rules is 
especially strong for provisions at least partly aimed at making factfinding more 
accurate.  The more severe the crime, the more we also want to convict the guilty, 
but the more we want to prevent convicting the innocent as well.17 Lowering the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, for instance, in murder cases would help deter 
an especially serious sort of crime, but only at the expense of correspondingly 
increasing the number of especially serious wrongful convictions.  And even for the 
First and Fourth Amendments, where the increasing strength of the government 
interest isn’t generally matched by corresponding increases in the strength of the 
private interest,18 courts have generally not drawn any explicit severity distinctions.19
Yet this refusal to draw severity distinctions has obvious costs:  It may constrain 
the government too much when it fights very serious crimes, and too little when it 
fights minor ones.  The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” and in our daily lives we judge the reasonableness of a reaction in part 
based on the harm that it aims to avoid.  It seems appealing to have constitutional 
law do likewise.  Similarly, First Amendment law often asks whether a government 
17 Cf. Craig v. Maryland, 497 U.S. 836, 867-68 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (pointing out that 
the interest in preventing wrongful convictions is especially strong when the “innocent defendants 
[are] accused of particularly heinous crimes”). 
18
 The free speech interest in describing how to kill, for instance, isn’t greater than the free speech 
interest in describing how to infringe copyright.  See generally Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating 
Speech pt. I (circulated for publication) (discussing restrictions on both kinds of speech).
Luna, supra note 1, at 785, argues that Fourth Amendment rules shouldn’t turn on crime severity, 
partly because a crime’s seriousness “does not allow the state to circumvent or even relax other 
constitutional rights, such as the reasonable doubt standard or the right to trial by jury.”  But for the 
reasons given in the text, severity distinctions may be more apt for the First and Fourth Amendments 
than for the other rights.
19 See, e.g., Mincey; Branzburg; T.L.O.; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213-14 & nn.13-
14 (1979) (rejecting a balancing test that would allow detentions with less than probable cause based 
in part on “the gravity of the crime involved”).  See also Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 
supra note 6, at 2140 (noting that “most constitutional limits on policing are transsubstantive—they 
apply equally to suspected drug dealers and suspected terrorists,” and “there is no reason to believe 
that current exigencies will change it”); Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General 
Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 137 (1989) 
(asserting that Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1989), was “the first Supreme Court case to hold 
that the gravity of the underlying offense is relevant to any important fourth amendment issue, at least 
where a full scale search or seizure is involved”).
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inter est is “compelling.”  Presumably the interest in prosecuting some crimes is 
compelling, while the interest in prosecuting others isn’t.
And these costs have indeed led the courts to rely on constitutional severity 
distinctions, often without much discussion or even controversy.  Consider, for 
instance, the child pornography exception to the First Amendment.  Production of 
child pornography, the Court pointed out, is illegal, because it inherently involves the 
sexual exploitation of children.  Therefore, to deter this production, and to mitigate 
the harm that the production causes, the government may ban the distribution and 
even the possession of such material—even by people who aren’t directly conspiring 
with the producers—as well as the production itself.20
If the severity of the crime that the law is fighting is indeed constitutionally 
irrelevant, then the same logic would presumably allow other kinds of speech 
restrictions defended on a similar “deter the illegal production / illegal initial release” 
theory.  The government could, simply by citing the child pornography cases, justify 
bans on publishing news stories that are based on corporate secrets, trade secrets, or 
government secrets that some insider illegally leaked to the newspaper.21 It could 
justify bans on publishing cell phone conversations that were illegally recorded and 
sent anonymously to the media.22 And it could justify bans on publishing 
photographs or movies that depict actual animal cruelty.23
I doubt, though, that the Court would or should accept such restrictions simply by 
analogy to the child pornography cases.  Those cases explicitly relied on sexual 
exploitation of children being such a serious crime,24 serious enough to justify 
banning speech based on the fruits of the crime.  But when the speech springs from a 
lesser offense (such as an illegal leak), the need to deter the offense is less pressing, 
and the case for protecting speech is greater.
One can, of course, try to distinguish child pornography on other grounds, for 
instance based on the perceived difference in the value of the speech (though that 
20
 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990).
21 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After
Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 697, 739-48 (2003) (discussing these 
restrictions).
22 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding such publication to be constitutionally 
protected, at least in many instances).
23 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 48, which does ban the distribution of videos or photos that depict animal 
cruelty, but is at least limited—unlike child pornography law—to material that lacks serious value.  If 
severity doesn’t matter, then Congress could enact an even broader law, which applied even to 
valuable depictions.
24
 New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990).  
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 533 (holding unconstitutional, as applied, a statute that banned distribution 
of material that was drawn from an illegally intercepted telephone call).   Likewise, one distinction the 
Court gave when holding that private possession of child pornography was punishable, though private 
possession of simple obscenity was not, was that creation and further distribution of child 
pornography—the harmful conduct that legal possession tends to foster—are more harmful than the 
distribution of obscenity.  Osborne, 495 U.S. at 110.
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itself is a troublesome judgment for courts to make),25 or on the perceived difference 
in how hard it is to catch the producers themselves.26 But it seems to me that courts 
also should and would focus, as the child pornography cases themselves did, on the 
severity of the crime, and view the child pornography cases as a narrow exception 
limited to speech that involved truly grave crimes in its creation.  And in fact, the 
one situation in which courts might be most likely to ban publication of criminally 
leaked material—newspapers’ publishing extraordinarily damaging leaked military 
secrets27—is also the situation where the underlying crime seems to be most severe.
Likewise, consider the question whether shooting a fleeing suspect is an 
unconstitutional seizure.28 The Court has held that it’s reasonable to shoot a fleeing 
suspect when the police have probable cause to believe that he’s a murderer; the
risks to the murderer’s potential future victims are otherwise just too great.29
But it seems unreasonable to shoot a fleeing suspect simply because he’s a 
shoplifter or a marijuana user—the pressing concern about public safety that justified 
the decision to allow shooting at the fleeing murder suspect is absent.  If we want 
both to avoid paralyzing the police officers faced with the really dangerous 
criminals, and to avoid letting police officers kill even minor criminals, some 
severity determinations are required.
III. OPTION 2:  DISTINGUISHING SEVERITY USING RULES THAT TURN ON THE 
CRIME’S OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
Judges could try to create rules distinguishing offenses based on the inherent 
characteristics of the crime, such as whether the crime involves violence.  The Court 
in Tennessee v. Garner, for instance, held that the Fourth Amendment generally bars 
the police from shooting at a fleeing felon unless “the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime 
involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm.”30  Though 
“burglary is a serious crime,” the Court concluded, “it is [not] so dangerous as 
automatically to justify the use of deadly force,” because it is “a ‘property’ rather 
25 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 530 n.13 (stressing the “minimal value” of the child pornography at 
issue in Ferber).
26 Compare id. at 530-31 (arguing that in most cases where an illegally intercepted conversation 
is published, the identity of the interceptor himself will be known, though acknowledging that in some 
unusual cases, it will not be) with id. at 549 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing, in my view more 
plausibly, that the identity of the interceptor may often be unknown).
27 Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 735-40 (1971) (White, J., concurring 
in the judgment, joined by Stewart, J.) (suggesting that such publication might well be criminally 
pun ishable); id. at 752-59 (Harlan, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and Blackmun, J.) 
(concluding that such publication could even be enjoined).
28
 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
29 Id. at 11-12.
30 Id. at 11.
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than a ‘violent’ crime.”31
Similarly, Coker v. Georgia held that the death penalty was an excessive 
punishment for the rape of an adult, because “in terms of moral depravity and of the 
injury to the person and to the public, [rape] does not compare with murder, which . . 
. involve[s] the unjustified taking of human life.”32  It’s possible that the death 
penalty may still be available for child rape and for very serious national security 
crimes such as treason and espionage.33  But the Court must have understood Coker
as effectively limiting the death penalty almost exclusively to murder prosecutions, 
which is how it has indeed been in practice applied.  And this limitation reflects a 
fairly clear and coherent (though not uncontroversial34) rule that the infliction of 
death should be reserved largely for those who themselves inflict death.
There are, however, three problems with this sort of line-drawing.  First, only a 
few fairly clear lines are available.  The distinctions between violent crimes and 
property crimes, victimless crimes and other crimes, reckless conduct and negligent 
conduct, negligent conduct and nonnegligent conduct, and murder and other crimes 
are possibilities; but few others come to mind.35
If one thinks that the constitutional rule should track one of these lines, the 
limited set of lines isn’t a problem.  But if one thinks, for instance, that speakers 
should be free to incite minor property crimes but not severe ones,36 or that they 
should be free to publish books that reveal ways to kill someone (for instance, 
detective stories that describe ingenious murder methods) but not books that reveal 
ways to kill thousands of people at once,37 then one might not be able to find any 
place to draw a sharp line.
Second, even these supposedly sharp distinctions aren’t always so sharp.  For 
instance, there are bitter disagreements about what constitutes a victimless crime.  To 
31 Id. at 21.  See also State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1521 
(2003) (holding that the Due Process Clause limits the amount of punitive damages, and that one 
factor in this limitation was the gravity of the defendant’s misconduct, determined based on factors 
such as whether “the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic”).
32
 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977).
33 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996) (child rape); 10 U.S.C. § 906a 
(espionage) (enacted 1985).
34 See Coker, 433 U.S. at 607-13 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
35
 Schroeder, supra note 10, at 520, also discusses possible distinctions between malum 
prohibitum and malum in se crimes, and between crimes that involve moral turpitude and crimes that 
don’t.  Both these distinctions, though, are rather vague, see Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 236 
(1951); Schroeder, supra note 10, at 521 (moral turpitude), and they also don’t correlate particularly 
well with seriousness:  Shoplifting, for instance, is malum in se and involves moral turpitude.  See
Johnson v. State, 291 So. 2d 336 (Ala. 1974) (theft involves moral turpitude).
36 Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
37 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 18, pt. V.C (taking this view); United
States v. Progressive, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 5 (W.D. Wis. 1979) (enjoining the publication of article 
describing how a hydrogen bomb could be constructed), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 
1979).
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some, drug dealing is a victimless crime.  To others, drug crimes have many victims
(even setting aside the victims caused by the criminalization of drugs)—minors who 
start using drugs even though they lack the maturity to weigh the risks, people who 
are killed by intoxicated drivers, and so on.  In Harmelin v. Michigan, for instance, 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence concluded that possessing 650 grams of cocaine was 
a serious enough crime to justify life imprisonment, and that “[p]etitioner’s 
suggestion that his crime was nonviolent and victimless, echoed by the dissent, is 
false to the point of absurdity.  To the contrary, petitioner’s crime threatened to cause 
grave harm to society.”38  And more generally, most supposedly victimless crimes 
were criminalized because many people thought that the crimes did victimize 
someone, though perhaps indirectly.
The distinction between violent crimes and property crimes is less controversial 
in many cases; at least it’s clear that some crimes are genuinely merely property 
crimes.  But again, how does one classify drug crimes, which don’t inherently 
involve any outright violence, but do involve the risk of physical injury or even death 
to the drug users or to others?39  How does one classify residential burglary, which 
involves some risk of violence, though probably less than armed robbery does, and 
which also gravely undermines the victims’ sense of privacy and security?40  How 
does one classify illegal gun possession?
Third, even the sharp distinctions may be quite controversial.41  Murder may be 
38
 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).  But see Schroeder, 
supra note 10, at 524 (viewing the distinction between victimless crimes and other crimes more 
favorably).
39 Compare United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d 443, 452 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting) 
(“If my brothers’ ruling could be confined to narcotics pushers like Aguilar and Soyka or gamblers 
like Riggan, I would hardly dissent [from the decision excluding certain evidence as having been 
got ten in violation of the Fourth Amendment].  But that is not the received wisdom of today; at least 
in theory this decision would govern crimes of the greatest seriousness and cases where an arrest 
might lead to the recovery of stolen property or even a kidnapped child rather than of contraband.”) 
and Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 508 N.E.2d 870, 872-73 (Mass. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the 
Fourth Amendment barred a warrantless entry into a home for the purposes of arresting a resident, 
even when exigent circumstances were present, partly because possessing cocaine or heroin wasn’t a 
crime of violence) with Schroeder, supra note 10, at 531 (citing those two cases, but responding that 
“one could argue that the drug trade is so intimately bound up in violence that it is, in effect, a violent 
crime”).
40 See People v. Weaver, 161 Cal. App. 3d 119, 127 (1984) (reasoning that “[r]esidential burglary 
is an extremely serious crime presenting a high degree of danger to society,” because of “the danger 
that the intruder will harm the occupants in attempting to perpetrate the intended crime or to escape 
and the danger that the occupants will in anger or panic react violently to the invasion, thereby 
inviting more violence,” and because residential burglary “involves an invasion of perhaps the most 
secret zone of privacy”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
41 Cf. Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 & n.5 (1989) (opining that on such 
matters “the judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that of a legislature, 
which is far better equipped to perform the task, and [is] likewise more responsive to changes in 
attitude and more amenable to the recognition and correction of their misperceptions in this respect”) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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more heinous than adult rape or child rape, but is it so qualitatively different that the 
Eighth Amendment should preclude the death penalty for the latter two crimes?42
How can one rebut, in a principled way, those who say that child rape is so evil and 
harmful that it ought to be treated like murder rather than like robbery?
So such lines may give the government more power to use harsh methods against 
serious crimes without providing the same power for all crimes.  And the lines may 
provide this power while decreasing the need for courts to subjectively decide, in 
case after case, just how se rious the judges find a particular crime to be.
But the lines will require at least some subjective decisionmaking when drawing 
the line up front.  They will probably require some such decisionmaking even in later 
cases, when the line proves not to be perfectly crisp and objective.  And they may 
limit courts to only a narrow set of available severity distinctions.
IV. OPTION 3:  DISTINGUISHING SEVERITY USING RULES THAT TURN ON THE 
LEGISLATURE’S OWN CATEGORIZATION OF THE CRIME
Judges could also create rules that distinguish offenses based on the legislature’s 
own categorizations, such as whether the offense is a crime or just a tort, whether it’s 
a felony or a misdemeanor, whether it can lead to jail time, or how much jail time it 
can lead to.
For instance, the Supreme Court has taken the view that the criminal jury trial 
right was originally understood not to apply to “petty crimes.”  What, then, is a petty 
crime?  The Court acknowledged, in Duncan v. Louisiana, that “the boundaries of 
the petty offense category have always been ill-defined,” but concluded that “[i]n the 
absence of an explicit constitutional provision, the definitional task necessarily falls 
on the courts. . . .  [I]t is necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of crime, separating 
petty from serious infractions.”43
This line, the Court had earlier held, should be drawn “not subjectively by 
recourse of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards 
such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a 
gauge of its social and ethical judgments.”44  And because the general practice 
42 See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 685 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1996) (holding that people who rape children 
may be sentenced to death, because child rape is a more severe crime than rape); Sherry Colb, 
FINDLAW.COM WRIT, Is Capital Punishment Too Harsh for Rapists?, Sept. 10, 2003, available at 
http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/colb/20030910.html (“It is arbitrary . . . to treat child rape as 
qualitatively more heinous than the ‘rape of an adult woman,’ for death penalty purposes.  To do so 
minimizes the devastation of rape for women, because it suggests that although the rape of one 
category of people is bad enough to call for execution, adult women do not qualify—as a matter of 
constitutional law—for inclusion in that category.”).
43 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160-61 (1968).
44
 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937); see also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 
(concluding that the line should be drawn by “refer[ring] to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws 
and practices in the Nation,” citing Clawans); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970) 
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throughout the country seems to have been to distinguish offenses with maximum 
jail terms of six months or less from offenses with longer maximum terms,45 the 
Court has more or less settled on this as the constitutional di stinction.
Likewise, in Welsh v. Wisconsin, the Court held that a warrantless home arrest 
couldn’t be justified by the Fourth Amendment’s exigent circumstances exception 
when the person was being arrested for a nonjailable misdemeanor.  The 
misdemeanor was drunk driving, which at least one member of the majority thought 
was very dangerous.46  Still, the Court concluded that Wisconsin’s classifying the 
misdemeanor as a nonjailable offense was “the best indication of the State’s interest 
in precipitating an arrest, and is one that can be easily identified both by the courts 
and by officers faced with a decision to arrest.”47
The severity distinction in Welsh differs from the one in Duncan:  In Welsh and 
in the other cases I discuss in this Essay, the severity of the crime cut in favor of 
weaker constitutional protection, while in Duncan it cut in favor of stronger
protection.  Still, the core question is similar:  When some factor—constitutional text 
(“reasonable[ness]” in Welsh), constitutional history (the acceptance, from the late 
1700s to the present, of trials without jury for petty offenses),48 or felt necessity (the 
compelling interest exception to free speech protection49)—suggests some distinction 
between more and less serious crimes, how are courts to draw this distinction?  The 
Court’s answer in these cases is to piggyback on legislative line-drawing.
This approach lets courts create lines that are quite sharp; and it can let judges 
avoid entirely substituting their views for legislators’ views, since they can point to 
(likewise).
45 Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161 & n.33.  The Court has also held that the right to appointed counsel 
applies only when the defendant faces actual jail time.  Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).  
The justification for this distinction, though, rested on severity of the specific punishment 
(imprisonment) that the defendant faced, not on the severity of the crime:  The defendant may, for 
instance, be prosecuted without appointed counsel even for a crime that is theoretically punishable by 
some prison time, if the judge simply announces that he will not impose any prison sentence even if 
the defendant is found guilty.  All that the Court had to decide, then, is that the risk of loss of liberty 
justifies a certain procedural protection—the Justices didn’t actually have to draw distinctions 
between different categories of offense.
46
 466  U.S. 740, 752 (1984). 
47 Id. at 754.  See also Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 365 (2001) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that it should be unconstitutional to arrest a person for a nonjailable offense, 
absent special circumstances, because “If the State has decided that a fine, and not imprisonment, is 
the appropriate punishment for an offense, the State’s interest in taking a person suspected of 
committing that offense into custody is surely limited, at best.”); State v. Jones, 727 N.E.2d 886, 893 
(Ohio 2000) (adopting such a rule), reaffirmed in relevant part, State v. Brown, 792 N.E.2d 175, 179 
(Ohio 2003) (reaffirming the rule under the Ohio Constitution, notwithstanding Atwater); State v. 
Bauer, 36 P.3d 892, ¶ 33 (Mont. 2001) (adopting such a rule under the Montana Constitution).
48 See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional 
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926).
49 See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417 (1997).
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legislative judgments that themselves acknowledge that certain crimes aren’t very 
serious.  After all, if the legislature didn’t think some offense was worth making a 
felony, how can the government argue that the offense is serious enough to justify 
special relaxation of Fourth Amendment rules?50
But here too courts will find few places in which they can draw the line.  The 
lines between crimes and torts, jailable and nonjailable offenses, and felonies and 
misdemeanors are reasonable candidates.51  Occasionally, when validating existing 
practices, courts may also rely on a longstanding legislative tradition supporting 
some line; such a tradition seemingly existed for the six-month distinction between 
petty offenses and serious ones as to the right to jury trial.52  When courts are looking 
for a place to draw a relatively novel line, though, they’ll have few existing options 
to use.
Serious felonies and minor felonies, for instance, can’t easily be distinguished, 
unless courts start drawing rather arbitrary distinctions based on the maximum length 
of the prison term.53  Distribution of child pornography and of newspaper articles 
based on material that someone leaked in violation of a felony trade secret law would 
have to be treated equally.  So would the fleeing killer and the fleeing thief of 
products that are worth more than the felony theft threshold.
Moreover, when severity leads to less constitutional protection, the legislature 
would often be able to easily get that lowering of protection just by upgrading the 
offense.  Say, for instance, that the Fourth Amendment prevents the police from 
using certain search techniques for nonjailable offenses, or that the First Amendment 
prevents grand juries from subpoenaing reporters to get information about the 
50 But see Schroeder, supra note 10 (concluding that relatively lenient treatment for a crime “may 
not always reflect a cavalier attitude toward the offense,” but rather “a feeling that penal sanctions are 
not always the best solution to a social problem,” or “a desire to ‘increase the ease of conviction and 
the overall deterrent effect of the enforcement effort,’” quoting Welsh, 466 U.S. at 763 (White, J., 
dissenting)).
51 But see Schroeder, supra note 10, at 508-09 (criticizing the felony/misdemeanor line, because 
“[i]n many jurisdictions the same conduct can be either a misdemeanor or felony depending on how it 
is prosecuted or depending on the institution to which the offender is sentenced,” and because 
“numerous misdemeanors involve conduct more dangerous than many felonies”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The line between capital and noncapital offenses might have been plausible in the 
past, see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987) (discussing this as a dividing line for the 
right to bail); but today is itself more a judicially determined line, defined by the Court’s death 
penalty caselaw, rather than a legislatively determined one.
52 See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970) (selecting six months as the dividing line 
because “with a few exceptions, crimes triable without a jury in the American States were . . . 
generally punishable by no more than a six-month prison term,” and because when an earlier case on 
the subject was decided two years before, “we could discover only three instances in which a State 
denied jury trial for a crime punishable by imprisonment for longer than six months”).
53
 The misdemeanor/felony line may also turn in many states on the length of the permissible 
prison term, but at least it’s a line that has long historical significance, considerable collateral legal 
consequences—such as, in many states, place of incarceration, denial of the right to possess guns even 
after one is freed, and loss of the right to vote—and considerable reputational consequences.
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commission of misdemeanors.  The legislature can just upgrade the offense into a 
felony, but provide enough alternative charges or sentences so that the prosecutor 
can investigate the crime as a felony but prosecute it as a nonjailable misdemeanor, 
or so that a judge can routinely suspend any prison sentence.54
There might be some political opposition to upgrading torts to crimes, or to 
seriously upgrading petty crimes that many people commit, such as minor traffic 
offenses.  But it’s not clear how much opposition there would be:  Consider, for 
instance, many states’ authorization of custodial arrests even for traffic offenses, 
when the traffic offenses are treated as criminal infractions.55 So by and large, any 
severity distinctions that turn on the legislature’s own characterization of the crime 
won’t much constrain the government:  The “severe crimes” zone will be reached at 
a rather low level, and the legislature should find it fairly easy to move even petty 
offenses into that zone.
V. OPTION 4:  DISTINGUISHING SEVERITY BASED ON CASE-BY-CASE 
EVALUATION
Finally, judges may decide case by case which offenses are serious enough and 
which aren’t.  That apparently happened with the First Amendment child 
pornography exception, which was based partly on the conclusion that sexual 
exploitation of children is such a serious crime.56  The Court’s Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause cases have likewise held—though over strong disagreement—
that courts must determine the propriety of sentences partly by evaluating, case by 
case, the severity of the crimes.57 The Excessive Fines Clause caselaw requires 
54 See Schroeder, supra note 10, at 509, 517 (making this point); id. at 517 (noting that this may 
be unlikely when relatively little extra government power is at stake).  Of course, when severity 
means more constitutional protection, as with the right to trial by jury, the legislature may have less 
flexibility, because lowering the maximum sentence will constrain prosecutors and judges more than 
lowering the minimum sentence would.
55 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 355-58 (2001); Wayne A. Logan, Street 
Legal: The Court Affords Police Constitutional Carte Blanche, 77 IND. L.J. 419, 429-49 (2002) 
(arguing that such arrests are not uncommon, and aren’t likely to be statutorily restrained); Michele 
Deitch, Veto Risks Texans’ Civil Rights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 1, 2001, at 5J (noting that the 
Texas governor vetoed a bill that would have generally barred warrantless arrests for petty traffic 
offenses); Texas Legislature, Actions: Bill: SB 730-Legislative Session: 77(R),
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/cgi-
bin/db2www/tlo/billhist/actions.d2w/report?LEG=77&SESS=R&CHAMBER=S&BILLTYPE=B&BIL
LSUFFIX=00730&SORT=Asc (confirming veto).
56 See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
57 See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20-24 (2003) (reaffirming the case-by- case 
approach); id. at 31-32 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (rejecting such an approach).  The test 
is actually a three-prong test, which requires courts to consider first “(i) the gravity of the offense and 
the harshness of the penalty,” and then in “the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime 
committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality,” also compare 
the sentence with “(ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the 
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courts to judge the magnitude of a fine in light of its severity.58  And, similarly, the 
Court has held that the government must show an “overriding justification” to force 
defendants to take antipsychotic drugs in order to become competent to stand trial, 
and that an accusation of “serious crime” would provide such a justification.59
This approach seems appealing, precisely because it lets courts decide in each 
case how severe a crime is, without having to rely on bright lines that might not 
perfectly fit judges’ sense of crime severity.  There are three main difficulties, 
though, with this approach.
First, it creates a good deal of uncertainty, both for government officials and for 
citizens.  May police officers engage in warrantless searches of cars suspected to 
contain smuggled alcohol, smuggled marijuana, or smuggled counterfeit products?60
What sentence may a judge constitutionally impose on someone who has been 
convicted of this particular crime, and has this particular criminal history?  May the 
legislature outlaw incitement of trespass on unenclosed land, to borrow Justice 
Brandeis’s example?61  May it outlaw communications that facilitate relatively minor 
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.”  Id. at 22, 30.  The 
second and third factors are more akin to an evaluation based on legislative categorizations of the 
crime (see supra Part IV), though they may also look to decisions made by other sentencing judges; 
only the first factor thus properly fits in this Part.  Nonetheless, as the Court pointed out, it is only “the 
rare case” in which courts must go beyond the first factor to the second and the third.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
59
 Sell v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2003).  The Court’s Fourth Amendment “special 
needs” case at times stress the harmfulness of the conduct that the search or seizure is trying to 
uncover.  See, e.g., Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (stressing, in 
upholding checkpoints aimed at catching and deterring drunk drivers, “the magnitude of the drunken 
driving problem” and “the States’ interest in eradicating it”); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ 
Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989) (stressing the “compelling Government interests served by” a drug 
and alcohol testing program for railway employees involved in certain train accidents).  It’s not clear, 
though, how significant a role this factor plays, or when the Court would conclude that the need is not
great enough.  In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), for instance, the Court suggested that 
checkpoints might be permitted even to check to make sure people aren’t driving without a license or 
a registration. Id. at 663.  Likewise, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), the Court used a 
“special needs” rationale to allow searches of public schools students based merely on “reasonable 
suspicion,” and explicitly rejected the view that “some rules regarding student conduct are by nature 
too ‘trivial’ to justify a search based upon reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 342 n.9.
Conversely, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000), and Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston, 523 U.S. 67 (2001), the Court struck down drug checkpoints and the testing of obstetrics 
patients for drugs, because these programs were aimed at advancing “the general interest in crime 
control,” 531 U.S. at 44; 532 U.S. at 81, even though the crime that they were trying to control was 
quite serious, likely as serious as drunk driving.  The Court’s special needs cases today thus seem 
focused primarily on whether the searches and seizures are aimed at some interest other than crime 
control, on how intrusive they are, and on how much discretion they leave to the police—the 
seriousness of the crime being detected or deterred seems to be less significant.
60 Cf. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1948) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (alcohol 
smuggling).
61 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
16 CRIME SEVERITY [15-Mar-04
crimes, such as drivers’ alerting other drivers about a speed trap, or newspaper 
reporters’ informing people about Web sites that contain copyright-infringing 
mate rial?62
Conversely, may speakers feel free to engage in such incitement or crime-
facilitating speech?  If the only announced rule is that the speech restriction is 
permitted for speech that urges or aids “serious” crimes but not “less serious” crimes, 
then people can’t know what they’re allowed to say, at least until courts in this 
particular jurisdiction set a square precedent related to this particular offense.
Second, the approach requires courts to repeatedly draw distinctions that are hard 
to explain using any constitutional principle.  This need not be a fatal objection:  
Perhaps so long as there is a constitutional principle that shows the need to draw a 
line somewhere, courts should feel free to draw such a line even if they can’t explain 
the principle underlying their decision to draw it in a particular place.63
Nonetheless, neither is it an empty objection.  Judgments about a crime’s severity 
are often hotly contested.  How seriously one should treat drug abuse, illegal gun 
carrying, blocking of abortion clinic entrances, drunk driving, and similar crimes are 
questions that have no logically provable answer.
Legislators can draw distinctions based simply on their own moral judgments, or 
their constituents’ moral judgments.64  But judges, and especially unelected federal 
judges, derive much of their credibility from the perception that they’re doing 
something different than just applying their own moral judgments.  And turning each 
crime severity distinction into a constitutional issue—an issue on which the judge’s 
decision will trump the legislator’s decision—will highlight the arbitrariness of the 
judges’ choice, not just once when a general rule is created but each time a case 
arises. 
Third, because an ad hoc approach requires courts to make repeated decisions 
that are controversial, that set aside legislative judgments about severity, and that do 
so without any seeming application of a principle, some judges—not all, but some—
62 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 18, at pt. I (citing examples of such speech, 
and of the laws under which it might be restricted).
63 See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160-61 (1968) (“In the absence of an explicit 
constitutional provision [explaining which crimes are so petty that they don’t require a jury trial], the 
definitional task necessarily falls on the courts. . . .  [I]t is necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of 
crime, separating petty from serious infractions.  This process, although essential, cannot be wholly 
satisfactory, for it requires attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie near the 
line, actually differ very little.”); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (“Our task 
in this case is to articulate more clearly the boundaries of what [delay before determination of 
probable cause following a warrantless arrest] is permissible under the Fourth Amendment.  Although 
we hesitate to announce that the Constitution compels a specific time limit, it is important to provide 
some degree of certainty so that States and counties may establish procedures with confidence that 
they fall within constitutional bounds.  Taking into account the competing interests articulated in [an 
earlier case], we believe that a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause 
within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement . . . .”).
64 See, e.g., examples cited supra in note 11.
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may feel obliged to defer to the legislative judgments even while purporting to 
review those judgments.65 Such decisionmaking will thus tend to lead courts to 
ultimately define the gravity threshold at a pretty low level.  Some examples:
1.  In Riggins v. Nevada, the Court held that criminal defendants may not be 
forced to take antipsychotic drugs in order to become competent to stand trial, unless 
there is “overriding justification.”66  A decade later, in Sell v. United States, the 
Court interpreted this as requiring that “important governmental interests [be] at 
stake,” and concluded that this test was satisfied if the defendant is “accused of a 
serious crime.”67  But the Court then held that an “important” interest is present 
“whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against 
property,” because “[i]n both instances the Government seeks to protect through 
application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.”68  This may well 
be the right result, but it does show judges’ reluctance to dismiss some crimes, even 
nonviolent crimes, as too petty to pass the severity threshold.69
2.  In cases where defendants invoke the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
65 See, e.g., Part II, which described Supreme Court decisions that purported to categorically 
reject any such ad hoc decisionmaking.  I argue in the rest of this Essay that judges haven’t always 
been so reluctant to draw such lines, and that perhaps they shouldn’t be so reluctant.  But the cases in 
Part II show that at least some judges are reluctant to exercise their power to draw constitutionality 
severity lines.
66
 504 U.S. 127, 135 (1992).
67
 123 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2003).
68 Id.  The “compelling government interest” prong of the First Amendment strict scrutiny test 
may seem like an authorization for the Court to distinguish the exceptionally strong government 
interests from the weaker ones.  In practice, though, the Court has not been willing to use this prong 
this way:  The Court has found compelling interests not just in preventing violence or injury to 
national security, but also in shielding children from purely psychological harm caused by exposure to 
sexual material, in preventing political corruption, in “eliminating from the political process the 
corrosive effect of political ‘war chests’ amassed with the aid of the legal advantages given to 
corporations,” and in ensuring that “criminals do not profit from their crimes” and that crime victims 
are compensated by the criminals.  Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 666 
(1990); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118-
19 (1991).  The strict scrutiny test has proven “strict in theory, fatal in fact,” because the Court has 
applied the test’s narrow tailoring prong in a demanding way, not because of the compelling interest 
prong.  See Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
supra note 49, at 2420-22; Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 
8 (1972) (coining the “strict in theory, fatal in fact” line, though as to equal protection rather than free 
speech) (quotation marks omitted),
69 Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Springer v. One 1940 Mercury 5-Passenger Coupe, 223 P.2d 121, 124 
(Okla. 1950) (O’Neal, J., dissenting) (citing Justice Jackson’s Brinegar dissent for the proposition that 
“Under some circumstances, depending somewhat on the gravity of the offense, it might be 
reasonable for an officer to stop any and all automobiles driving along a highway at a given point,” 
and giving Justice Jackson’s example of a child being kidnapped, but then applying the same logic to 
the search for a stolen car).
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to challenge the length of a prison term, the Court has generally deferred to 
legislative judgments of severity, largely because it has lacked a clear, defensible 
way to draw lines between offenses. In Ewing v. California, for instance, the Court 
upheld a 25-years-to-life sentence for a repeat offender who had been convicted of 
stealing merchandise worth $1,200, and had a prior record that included a robbery, 
three burglaries, and various lesser offenses.  In upholding the sentence, the Court 
did point to Ewing’s criminal history, but it also stressed the need to defer to 
legislative judgments of gravity:  Ewing’s instant crime, the court said, “should not 
be taken lightly. . . .  Theft of $1,200 in property is a felony under federal law . . . 
and in the vast majority of States. . . .”  And Ewing’s sentence under the repeat 
offender statute “reflects a rational legislative judgment, entitled to deference, that 
offenders who have committed serious or violent felonies and who continue to 
commit felonies must be incapacitated.”70
3.  The text of the Excessive Fines Clause seems to require some judgment of 
severity, since often the excessiveness of a fine can only be determined relative to 
how severe the offense is.71  But even there, the Supreme Court’s rule requires 
deference to the legislature.  Fines are struck down only if they are “grossly 
disproportional,”72 and reviewing courts are to “grant substantial deference to the 
broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and 
limits of punishments for crimes.”73
The same can be expected in other situations.  For instance, if courts conclude 
that the First Amendment requires them to distinguish speech based on the 
seriousness of the crime that the speech advocates or facilitates, they may feel 
similar pressure to “defer[]” to “rational legislative judgment” about the “gravity of 
the offense.”  Courts may be reluctant to distinguish, for instance, bans on publishing 
bomb-making information from bans on publishing drug-making information,74
70
 123 S. Ct. 1179, 1189-90 (2003).  See also Barry L. Johnson, Purging the Cruel and Unusual, 
2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 461, 504 (characterizing the Court’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause 
jurisprudence as resting partly on the fear that “strict proportionality review would promote 
inappropriate judicial activism in evaluating the seriousness of criminal offenses,” because 
“proportionality determinations require inherently subjective comparisons of sentence severity with 
offense seriousness,” comparisons that should instead “be left to legislatures, which are institutionally 
better positioned to determine the seriousness of a given offense”).
71
 In some cases, such as in rem forfeiture cases, excessiveness might theoretically be determined 
without looking at the crime’s severity, for instance using a per se rule that forfeiture of the 
instrumentality of a crime is per se not excessive.  Compare United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 
321, 344-47 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (so arguing) with id. at 333-34 (rejecting this argument).   
But for a typical criminal fine, such an approach would be unavailable:  The excessiveness judgment 
would have to consider the crime’s severity.
72 Id. at 334.
73 Id. (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)).
74
 So far Congress has treated the two differently.  Compare 18 U.S.C. § 842(p) (banning the 
distribution of certain kinds of speech that facilitate bomb-making) with S. 1428, 106th Cong., 1st 
Sess., sec. 9 (unsuccessfully proposing a similar ban as to speech related to drug-making).  The 
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given that many people find drug manufacturing to be as deadly as bomb 
manufacturing.75  And this may be true even if the judges might themselves view 
drug manufacturing as a less serious crime.76
Once courts have upheld bans on drug-making and bomb -making information, 
they might be reluctant to take a different view as to newspaper articles that explain 
flaws in computer security systems and thus facilitate computer security violation,77
even though computer crime is just property crime rather than violent crime or drug 
crime.  After all, computer crimes are often felonies (like the similar property crimes 
in Ewing or Sell), and can in the aggregate lead to very serious harm, such as the vast 
damage that computer viruses can cause. And once courts uphold bans on that 
information that facilitates computer crime, they may find it hard to distinguish, say, 
information that describes how people evade taxes, that tells people about copyright-
infringing sites, or that discusses holes in copy protection schemes78—especially if 
Congress raises the penalties for such property crimes and the speech that facilitates 
them, thus announcing that it’s taking the crimes especially seriously.
Such deference to legislatures seems particularly likely because many judges 
would find it both normatively and politically attractive.  Deference avoids conflicts
with legislators and citizens who firmly and plausibly argue that certain crimes are 
extremely serious, and who resent seeing those crimes treated as less constitutionally
significant than other crimes.79  Deference shifts from the judges the burden of 
drawing and defending distinctions that don’t rest on any crisp rules.  Deference fits 
the notion that arbitrary line-drawing decisions, such as arbitrary gradations of crime, 
arbitrary threshold ages for driving or drinking, and so on are for the legislature 
rather than for judges.80
These are all good arguments for deference.  The Court may have been correct in 
its cases dealing with the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Excessive Fines 
question is what might happen if Congress does ban the drug-making information.
75 See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(arguing that drug crimes are extremely serious); Eugene Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1056-71 (2003) (describing such “equality slippery slopes”).
76 See Yale Kamisar, “Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary 
Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 23-29 (1987) (asking, with regard to a serious crimes exception to the 
exclusionary rule, “Is a Short List of ‘Serious Crimes’ Likely To Stay Short?,” and arguing that the 
answer is “no”).
77 See Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, supra note 1, at pt. I (citing examples of such speech 
restrictions).
78 See id. at pt. I (citing examples of such speech restrictions).
79 See Volokh, Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, supra note 75, at 1059-61.
80 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 308, 310 n.3 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also
Luna, supra note 1, at 786-87 (“Even a sliding scale adopting limited categories of serious offenses 
will face tremendous pressure to expand upon those crimes exempted from the exclusionary rule. . . .  
[T]he courts may be required to draw fine lines between different types of drugs as well as between 
kinds of drug offenses, reaching difficult conclusions of pharmacology and socio-economics and 
looking altogether legislative in operation.”).
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Clause, and the right to be free from involuntary antipsychotic medication, where it 
set a fairly low severity threshold for legislative action. But precisely because the 
arguments for deference are plausible, many judges who are asked to draw case-by-
case severity lines will over time come to draw the lines at a low level, treating most 
crimes as severe enough to justify the maximum latitude for the government.
VI. CONCLUSION
As I said at the outset, this Essay can’t generally answer the line-drawing 
questions with which it begins.  But it has, I hope, offered some suggestions for how 
such answers can be provided.  Let me recap them here.
1.  It’s probably wrong to say that courts should never draw constitutional lines 
distinguishing crimes based on their severity.  True, it’s hard to impose “rational 
limitations” that explain where an exception for especially severe or especially minor 
crimes will stop.  True, there are problems with judges “distinguishing between the 
value of enforcing different criminal laws” and “making a value judgment that a 
legislature had declined to make.”81  But there are problems with treating all crimes 
alike as well.  I’ve pointed to many cases where courts have drawn severity lines.  At 
least some of these lines, I think, must be drawn.
2.  Moreover, there are several ways these severity lines may be drawn.  The 
problems with any one line-drawing model (for instance, the case-by- case approach 
discussed in Part V) should thus not by itself lead us to entirely renounce 
constitutional severity distinctions:  One of the other approaches may well make 
more sense.
3.  At the same time, the criticisms of constitutional line-drawing in this area do 
have considerable force.  We may all agree that there is a difference between murder 
and littering, but it doesn’t follow that courts can create administrable lines that 
distinguish the various cases between the two extremes.  The sharpest lines are 
limited in number, so all the available ones may therefore fall in the wrong places; 
and many of the seemingly sharp lines are actually not as sharp as one might think.
As importantly, the less sharp lines may be unstable as well as vague.  Over time, 
courts may become tempted to move the lines down, treating more and more crimes 
as severe.  Yale Kamisar’s question, “Is a Short List of ‘Serious Crimes’ Likely To 
Stay Short?,” is worth keeping in mind.82
4.  Judges and commentators who urge courts to draw constitutional severity 
distinctions should thus do more than just argue the value of distinguishing severe 
crimes from petty ones.  They should also propose at least some specific potential 
distinctions, and explain why those distinctions are likely to work in practice.  And 
this is especially so when the commentator is proposing not just one severity 
81 See Mincey v. Arizona and Branzburg v. Hayes, cited and discussed in Part II.
82 See supra note 76.
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distinction, say between petty crimes and other crimes, but multiple gradations.83
The value of constitutional severity distinctions in the abstract should not be the 
issue.  Here the devil is in the details.  If courts can’t make the severity distinctions 
work in practice, then the distinctions’ merits in principle are of little consequence.  
And if courts can make them work in practice, then we might be able to live with 
their theoretical problems.
83 See, e.g., Stuntz, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment, 
supra note 1. 
